




# THE COMPANY OF MILITARY HISTORIANS

## A SURVEY OF CONFEDERATE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT QUARTERMASTER ISSUE JACKETS

by Leslie D. Jensen



Type II Richmond jacket of Private John Blair Royal, 1st Co., Richmond howitzers, showing where a shell hit Royal in the left arm during the Battle of Chancellorsville.

The study of American military uniforms has been pursued with increasing sophistication over the past forty-odd years, with the result that today we are light years ahead of our predecessors in nearly every period of our history. One area, however, remains only sparsely covered, and often is so dominated by the mythology of the past that the historical truth is difficult to discern.

The question of what type of uniforms the Confederate States of America issued to its troops has been of considerable interest for sometime, but to date little concrete evidence has surfaced that would allow us to differentiate between uniforms issued by the central government, those issued by the states, private or foreign purchases, and home made items. Despite some truly important work by members of the Company and others, we still remain ignorant of much of the inner workings of the Confederacy's supply system and clothing procurement practices.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps, too, we are still too easily lulled by an appealing image of the "ragged rebel," and therefore naively accept the concept of Johnny Reb being supplied indefinitely by the folks at home, conveniently ignoring the fact that no army, however resourceful, wages war very long if it doesn't develop a workable supply system.

Part of the problem in this area has been that what work that has been done, particularly by Company members, has concentrated on the distinctive uniforms worn by particular units, almost always from early in the war.<sup>2</sup> There are a number of good reasons for this. First, if any information on a distinctive uniform exists, it is usually fairly easy to find in period newspapers, letters, diaries or photographs. Second, the information is usually specific enough to allow reconstruction of the uniform, and the reconstruction conveniently fits a format such as Military Uniforms in America. Finally, most of these early war uniforms were sufficiently different from one another to illustrate unit distinctions and, therefore, are fit subjects for a plate series.

This type of research is important and badly needed. It helps to fill gaps in our knowledge and hopefully we will see even more of it in the future. It has helped us to learn a great deal about the uniforms of southern volunteers as they marched to war in 1861. What it has not done, however, is to help us learn much very specific about what the majority of Confederates were wearing for most of the conflict.

In this latter area, we have instead developed a body of knowledge of what we believe the "typical" Confederate looked like. The best of this provides us only a rough outline, while much of it is often nothing more than loose guesswork.<sup>3</sup> There are a number of reasons why nothing more concrete has been worked out to date.

First, the destruction, or at least the apparent destruction, of much of the Confederacy's Quartermaster records at the end of the war was a heavy blow to researchers. Compared to the massive Federal records, what has survived is a pittance. At the same time, much of what has survived has not been properly utilized. A great deal of useful information still exists, but it is scattered, and it takes dedicated work to retrieve it.

Second, research in this area has been affected by a school of thought that contends that Confederate resources, across the board, were uniformly inadequate to supply the army's needs, and that what Johnny Reb did receive in the way of clothing came overwhelmingly from the home folks. Obviously, in such a situation, there were no uniforms. Therefore, there's no point in looking for them.

Certainly, this school of thought was spawned and influenced by post-war Southern historical writing, much of which was directed towards justifying the Confederacy's efforts. Out of this school came the emphasis on the "ragged rebel." While certainly truthful at times, such as during the Sharpsburg campaign, the "ragged rebel" came to personify the Confederate soldier for the whole war. For southern apologists, it was a perfect image. Not only was the "ragged rebel" appealing as a staunch individualist fighting for his independence despite a lack of almost everything with which to do it, he also served as a plausible explanation for Confederate defeat. The more ragged and lacking he was in basic equipment, the more glorious his victories and the easier to accept his defeat. Other factors, such as unequal heavy industry, railroads, armament production and naval power were certainly far more powerful in their effects on the war effort than the clothing on the soldier's back, but the "ragged rebel" stood as a convenient symbol that has unfortunately obscured much of what the Confederacy accomplished, and has even diverted attention from some of the other things that went wrong."<sup>4</sup>

Strangely enough, much of the legend-building was accomplished by a limited number of individuals, many of them the sons and daughters of the veterans.<sup>5</sup> Most of the veterans themselves, in their reminiscences, never addressed the problems of supply at all, and of those that did, a surprising number challenged the prevailing view. As an example, W.W. Blackford, who served on General J.E.B. Stuart's staff, noted:

"...In books written since the war, it seems to be the thing to represent the Confederate soldier as being in a chronic state of starvation and nakedness. During the last year of the war this was partially true, but previous to that time it was not any

more than falls to the lot of all soldiers in an active campaign. Thriftless men would get barefooted and ragged and waste their rations to some extent anywhere, and thriftlessness is found in armies as well as at home. When the men came to houses, the tale of starvation, often told, was the surest way to succeed in foraging... " <sup>6</sup>

A close look at contemporary Confederate records, including those for the blackest period of the war, reveal some startling statistics. For example, during the last six months of 1864 and including to 31 January 1865, the Army of Northern Virginia alone was issued the following:

104,199 Jackets	140,570 Pairs of Trousers	167,862 Pairs of Shoes
157,727 Cotton Shirts	170,139 Pairs of Drawers	146,136 Pairs of Shoes
74,851 Blankets	27,011 Hats and Caps	21,063 Flannel Shirts
	4,861 Overcoats	

These were field issues only, and did not include issues to men on furlough, detailed at posts, paroled and exchanged prisoners or any other issues. Moreover, these were overwhelmingly central government issues, and did not include issues by any states except part of North Carolina's. During this same period, Georgia provided to the Confederate Army as a whole, over and above the figures quoted above:

26,795 Jackets	28,808 Pairs of Trousers	37,657 Pairs of Shoes
24,952 Shirts	24,168 Pairs of Drawers	23,024 Pairs of Socks
7,504 Blankets <sup>7</sup>		

At this same time, field returns showed the Army of Northern Virginia with a maximum strength of 66,533, including 4,297 officers. <sup>8</sup> Obviously, because of personnel turnover, the actual number of people in the army was somewhat greater; but at the same time it is obvious that with the exception of overcoats, hats and caps, and flannel shirts, many of which had already been provided, the Army of Northern Virginia was not only well supplied, but in some cases extravagantly so.

Moreover, while the statistics quoted above are from the records of the Quartermaster General, there is evidence that at troop unit level, the material was being received and there was a perception of abundant supplies. On 3 October 1864, a board of officers was convened in Corse's Brigade, Pickett's Division, to examine a lot of 226 jean jackets to determine whether they were fit for issue. If unfit, the jackets would have been condemned and more requisitioned. This quantity would have outfitted nearly a fourth of the brigade, and is highly doubtful that experienced officers would have even considered condemnation of such a large amount of clothing had it been difficult to obtain. Obviously, it wasn't. <sup>9</sup> This same brigade announced in February, 1865 that officers could buy shoes from the brigade quartermaster, "...the immediate wants of the troops ...being supplied..." <sup>10</sup>

Within the Confederacy's other armies, the same basic story seems to hold true, although some were not as well supplied as Lee's men. <sup>11</sup> Still, if scarcity was in fact not a problem, it stands to reason that at least some of this material ought to survive, and ought to be identifiable as Quartermaster products. Indeed, it can be, but not before one has a thorough understanding of the Confederate clothing procurement system.

The Confederate Quartermaster's Department was organized by Act of Congress 26 February 1861. This act, along with one passed 6 March, established the Confederate Regular Army, an organization with a paper strength of about 6,000 men. As finally organized, the Department was authorized one Quartermaster General with the rank of colonel, an Assistant Quartermaster General ranked as a lieutenant colonel, four Assistant Quartermasters graded as majors, and as many Assistant Quartermasters (AQMs) ranked as captains as the service might require. <sup>12</sup>

At the same time, a second series of acts established the Provisional Army of the Confederate States (PACS) and authorized the President to accept up to 100,000 volunteers for 12 months to man it. <sup>13</sup> The Quartermaster's Department, by law was responsible for clothing only the Regular Army. The volunteers of the Provisional Army were to provide their own clothing, for the use of which the government would pay each man equivalent of the cost of clothing for an NCO or private in the Regular Army, generally \$25.00 for each six months. This was the Commutation System. Initially it seems to have been intended to provide a means of clothing the troops without having to build government facilities to do it, to take advantage of the easiest way to clothe the army, and to avoid the risk of stockpiling mountains of material that might become useless surplus if there was no war. <sup>14</sup>

In the meantime, however, there was the Regular Army to supply. In April, 1861, the Quartermaster General, Col. A.C. Myers, ordered Capt. John M. Galt, AQM in New Orleans, to let contracts for 5,000 uniforms for Regular Army recruits. These uniforms were to consist of a blue flannel shirt to be worn as a blouse, steel gray woolen trousers, red or white flannel shirts, plus drawers, socks, bootees, blankets and leather stocks. <sup>15</sup> Caps were added later. <sup>16</sup>

On 24 May, Galt was sent a memo detailing the new regulation uniform that became official 6 June, and which is well known through the published uniform regulations. It is important to keep in mind that at this time these were Regular Army regulations. He was told to receive propositions from contractors for 10,000 suits of this new uniform and to advise the Quartermaster General as to price and quantity that could be obtained in New Orleans. <sup>17</sup>

Before he could respond, Galt received a flurry of correspondence from Richmond. On 31 May he was told to have suits of gray made up as fast as possible, and to let Myers know how fast clothing could be furnished. <sup>18</sup> Galt's reply that he could furnish 1500 full suits per week resulted in an order for 5000 gray jackets and pants, "...or any color you can get ...." <sup>19</sup> On 4 June, Galt was asked if he could supply 50,000 men from the resources of the city, <sup>20</sup> and the next day he was told to have "...clothing of every description, jackets, pants, shoes, drawers, shirts, flannels, socks..." made up as quickly as possible and sent to Richmond. At the same time he was told to stop the manufacture of the recruit clothing since the recruiting service was being discontinued. Once again, he was told to keep up the manufacture of the 1500 suits per week, although they were now to include "jackets" instead of the "tunics" prescribed in the regulations. <sup>21</sup>

Unfortunately, Galt misunderstood his orders. In response to the question of whether he could supply 50,000 men, he contracted with B.W. Woodlief for 50,000 uniforms. This committed the Quartermaster's Department far beyond its resources, and on 12 June Myers responded to word of Galt being ill by replacing him with Major Isaac T. Winnemore. <sup>22</sup>

Winnemore was told to stop all work on clothing, and to cancel the Woodlief contract. Therefore, very few, if any, of the uniforms prescribed by the 6 June regulations were produced. Myers' concern was not only with his budget, but with the quality and price of the New Orleans product and with the unauthorized contract with Woodlief.<sup>23</sup> More important, Myers was increasingly faced with the need to provide clothing on a far larger scale than had been envisioned or provided by law. On 5 June he had told Galt:

"... the mean description of cloth that the volunteers have been provided with is almost entirely worn out, and in a few weeks they will be destitute of most of the articles of clothing. The law requires volunteers to furnish themselves but as they cannot do so in the field, we must look after their comfort in this respect..." <sup>24</sup>

What Myers was announcing to Galt was nothing less than a radical new element in the Quartermaster mission. Whereas by law the Department was responsible only for clothing the roughly 6000 regulars, now it was taking on the open-ended responsibility of supplying some of the 100,000 volunteers as well. By mid-July, the new policy was in effect, with Congressional

sanction, and the Department was beginning to supply those volunteer troops in need, the most destitute being supplied first. <sup>25</sup> A letter to Captain J.A. Johnston at Norfolk explained the new system:

"...if the Captains of Companies can make an arrangement to obtain clothing to be paid for out of the \$21 due for the next six months, after the Commutation has been paid for the first six months, it would be better than to issue Government clothing to the Volunteers. If that cannot be done such articles of Clothing as are absolutely necessary may be issued to the Captains of Companies for their men, with instructions that the value of the Clothing is to be charged and deducted from the \$21 allowed for the next six months..." <sup>26</sup>

Despite the Department's good intentions, however, it was still only issuing clothing to needy volunteers, and then only when it had it. In response to his requests for clothing, General John B. Floyd was told that the law required volunteers to supply themselves, but when the government had clothing it was issued. At that time (July, 1861) the supply on hand was not sufficient to fill his requisition <sup>27</sup>

By 6 September, a Clothing Bureau had been set up in Richmond to manufacture clothing, one of several that would eventually supply the armies across the Confederacy. <sup>28</sup> This Clothing Bureau had two branches: the Shoe Manufactory under Captain Stephen Putney and the Clothing Manufactory under O.F. Weisiger. Weisiger, a former Richmond dry goods merchant, ran the Manufactory as a civilian until he was commissioned a Quartermaster Captain in 1863. <sup>29</sup>

Other manufactories were eventually established in Nashville, Tennessee; Athens, Atlanta and Columbus, Georgia; Montgomery, Tuscaloosa and Marion, Alabama; Jackson and Enterprise, Mississippi; Shreveport, Louisiana and elsewhere. Not all of the manufactories operated throughout the war, and by the latter half of the conflict the major centers were in Richmond, Athens, Atlanta and Columbus. <sup>30</sup>

These Clothing Bureaus operated in much the same way as the U.S. Army's Schuylkill Arsenal. A limited number of tailors in each manufactory cut out the pieces of each uniform. The pieces were bundled, and with the necessary trim, buttons and thread, were issued to seamstresses who sewed them together and were paid by the completed piece.

A typical operation was that at Atlanta. In April, 1863 it employed a total of twenty-seven men in-house: a Superintendent, two clerks, two inspectors, two trimmers and twenty tailors. These men cut and packaged the uniform pieces, while about 3,000 seamstresses in Atlanta did the actual sewing in their homes. With this force, the Atlanta operation manufactured, in the three months ending 31 December 1862:

37,150 Jackets	13,430 Pairs of Pants	13,700 Cotton Drawers
10,475 Cotton Shirts	500 Flannel Shirts	

Projections for the next year (March 1863-April 1864), if the material could continue to be supplied, were:

130,000 Jackets	130,000 Pants	175,000 Pairs of Drawers
175,000 Cotton Shirts	130,000 Shoes <sup>31</sup>	

The Richmond Manufactory was similar in size and scope, as were Athens and Columbus. Quartermasters contracted with various mills for finished woolen and cotton goods, in many cases supplying the raw material. <sup>32</sup>

At the same time, agents were dispatched overseas to procure materials, and in some cases finished products. Major J.B. Ferguson, who had been a purchasing agent for the Confederacy

early in the war, was sent to England in September, 1862 as the official Quartermaster purchasing agent there. He took over procurement of Quartermaster material from Major Caleb Huse, the Ordnance agent. These efforts began to yield large quantities of English Army shoes in 1863 as well as bulk woolen cloth. Although a good deal of this material was received in 1863, by 1864 the quantities were truly staggering.<sup>33</sup>

On 10 June 1864, Captain Weisiger received 4574 yards of English gray cloth, followed by 4983 more yards on 13 June and 2983 yards of blue English cloth on 16 June. During the same period he logged in 8425 yards of domestic woolen goods from four different manufacturers, for a total of 20,966 yards received in one week. This was a rather typical week, and although there were periods of lesser amounts, the overall volume remained roughly the same until the end of the war.

<sup>34</sup>

At the same time, a number of contracts were let with speculators for uniforms and cloth to be run through the blockade. Perhaps the biggest of these was let on 12 January 1864 with Haiman and Brother and David Rosenburg of Columbus, Georgia, for 100,000 uniforms. Delivery was to be in Liverpool, England in three batches, due on 1 May, 1 July and 1 October 1864. Initially to be procured in Prussia, the contract was later amended to allow purchase anywhere in Europe and extending the initial delivery date to 1 July and termination to 1 November 1864. A large portion of the contract had been received by July, 1864.<sup>35</sup>

In addition to central government operations, the states procured considerable quantities of clothing. In many cases these items came from Ladies Aid Societies,<sup>36</sup> but several of the states, notably Georgia and North Carolina, ran their own Quartermaster operations similar to those of the central government. In the case of the latter two states, the Confederate Quartermaster's Department made loose agreements that those states would continue to supply their own troops, with the overage going for general distribution.<sup>37</sup> Longstreet's Corps, for example, received 14,000 uniforms from the state of North Carolina during the winter of 1863-64<sup>38</sup>

By 8 October 1862, the issue system was considered to be strong enough that the old commutation system was officially ended.<sup>39</sup> Some troops, of course, had been on the issue system as early as the summer of 1861, while others did not get on it until late 1862 or early 1863. There is evidence that some troops in the west did not get off the commutation system until 1864<sup>40</sup> Still, in the main armies, the issue system was pretty much in place and functioning by 1863.

The issue system provided a table of allowances for specific types of clothing as well as prices that were to be charged for that clothing. If the soldier underdrew the allowance, he was paid the difference. If he overdrew, the difference was taken out of his pay. Prices gradually crept upward as the war went on, but the basic allowance and prices as of October, 1862 were as follows:

#### CLOTHING ALLOWANCE FOR FOR THREE YEARS<sup>41</sup>

Clothing	1st	2nd	3rd	Price
Cap, complete	2	1	1	\$2.00
Cover	1	1	1	.38
Jacket	2	1	1	12.00
Trousers	3	2	2	9.00
Shirt	3	3	3	3.00
Drawers	3	2	2	3.00
Shoes, pairs	4	4	4	6.00
Socks, pairs	4	4	4	1.00
Leather stock	1	0	0	.25
Great-coat	1	0	0	25.00

Stable-frock (mounted)	1	1	1	2.00
Fatigue overall	1	0	1	3.00
Blanket	1	0	1	7.50

It was under this system, with clothing supplied primarily by the various clothing manufactories, and supplemented by state issues, contract clothing and foreign imports, that the Confederate soldier was supplied. Of course, captured Federal clothing and items supplied by the soldiers' families also played apart, but the extent of it is hard to gauge, because this clothing generally does not appear on the official issue records, or when it is, is not delineated as such.<sup>42</sup>

The important thing to keep in mind about the Clothing Manufactories is that, in common with the decentralized nature of the war and the overall Confederate policy of each army supplying itself from its own departmental resources, the products of each depot varied depending on local resources. The patterns of the uniforms themselves also varied. Despite the fact that the Regulations called for "tunics" in 1861 and "frock coats" thereafter, the uniform prescribed by the 1862 issue system was the "jacket." There is no evidence that any of the central government depots produced frock coats in any numbers, although apparently some of the state operations did.<sup>43</sup> More importantly, at no time did the Quartermaster General detail to any of the depots exactly how the jackets were to be made. Thus, materials, cut, number of buttons, pockets and the presence or absence of trim were determined by each depot on its own, and probably changed as circumstances dictated.

Materials used could vary depending on what was available at any given time. The Richmond manufactory, for example, dealt mainly with four textile mills.<sup>44</sup> Of these, the Crenshaw Woolen Mills of Richmond was capable of producing all-wool material as well as woolen goods on a cotton warp.<sup>45</sup> Kelly, Tackett & Ford of Manchester, Virginia produced a variety, including red flannel and some sky blue cloth.<sup>46</sup> Bonsack & Whitmore of Bonsack's Depot, Virginia also produced only woolen jeans while the Scottsville Manufacturing Company of Scottsville, Virginia apparently did the same.<sup>47</sup> In addition, the Richmond Depot also received a considerable quantity of imported English cloth. Lining material was almost entirely unbleached cotton osnaburg, produced mainly by the Matoaca Manufacturing Company, the Battersea Mills and the Ettrick Manufacturing Company. These mills also produced shirting.<sup>48</sup> Despite the variety of materials, the patterns used for cutting the garments appear to have remained consistent over time.

What was true for Richmond was true for the other depots as well. Therefore, if today we find a group of uniforms with histories that indicate issue to a given army, and if those uniforms are consistent in cut, if not always in materials, they can usually be attributed to the main depot supplying the army.

Following are some tentative attributions of various uniform types to certain of the Quartermaster Depots. The term "tentative" must be emphasized here, for in over fifteen years of research and the examination of nearly 150 original Confederate enlisted men's uniforms, not one has yet been found with a depot marking, and none of those produced domestically even have a size mark.

Two basic rules of thumb in these attributions have been that there must be at least three surviving uniforms of a given type to constitute a pattern, and those uniforms should each have histories that indicate a common source. Moreover, if a uniform survives today and if the soldier who wore it was still in service in 1865, and unless there is evidence to the contrary, the uniform is considered to be the last one he was issued.

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## NOTES

1. The basic starting point in the material culture of this period is Frederick P. Todd, Lee A. Wallace, George Woodbridge and Michael J. McAfee, *American Military Equipage, 1851-1872* (Providence, 1974, 1977, 1978 and Privately Printed, 1978). A good broad brush approach to the Confederate supply system is John D. Goff, *Confederate Supply* (Durham, 1969), while a good study of Quartermaster operations in one department is James L. Nichols, *The Confederate Quartermaster in the Trans-Mississippi*, (Austin, 1964). Foreign operations are covered in Samuel Bernard Thompson, *Confederate Purchasing Operations Abroad*, (Chapel Hill, 1935) and Richard C. Todd, *Confederate Finance*, (Athens, 1954). None of these studies, however, have dealt with the Clothing Bureaus in enough detail to determine uniform types.
2. In particular, see MUIA plates 10, 99, 107, 127, 146, 151, 163, 176, 198, 219, and 236, all of which depict early war Confederate units. See also Frederick P. Todd, "Notes on the Organization and Uniforms of South Carolina Military Forces, 1860-1861," *MC&H*, III: 53-62 and Lee A. Wallace, Jr. "The Volunteers of the Second Brigade, Fourth Division," Part I, *MC&H*, X: 61-70; Part 11, *MC&H*, X 95-101; Part III, *MC&H*, XI: 70-79.
3. See, for example, Part V of William A. Albaugh III and Edward N. Simmons, *Confederate Arms* (Harrisburg, 1957).
4. A full list of the sources that support this theme would be impossible to list, but the basic concept is reiterated in article after article in *Confederate Veteran* magazine, as well as other veteran's publications, reminiscences and United Daughter of the Confederacy publications. More important, a strong oral tradition exists in this area.
5. The same legend building that applied to Robert E. Lee applied to the Confederacy as a whole. See Thomas L. Connelly, *The Marble Man, Robert E. Lee and His Image in American Society* (New York, 1977) for a discussion of the processes and some of the individuals involved.
6. W.W. Blackford, *War Years With J.E.B. Stuart* (New York, 1945), p. 99.
7. "Resources of the Confederacy in February, 1865," *Southern Historical Society Papers*, Vol. 11, No. 3, September, 1876, pp.117-120.
8. Walter H. Taylor, *Four Years With General Lee* (Reprint, New York, 1962), p. 183.
9. Special Order No. 57, 3 October 1864, Order Book, Corse's Brigade, Picken's Division, AXV., Eleanor S. Brockenbrough Library, Museum of the Confederacy, Richmond, VA.
10. *Ibid.*, Special Order No. 7, 18 February, 1865.
11. "Resources of the Confederacy..." S.H.S.P., B, 3, p.120.
12. "An Act for the Establishment and Organization of a General Staff for the Army of the Confederate States, 26 February, 1861. *War of the Rebellion, The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (GPO, Washington), IV, 1, p.114, cited hereafter as O.R.; "An Act for the Establishment and Organization of the Army of the Confederate States of America:" 6 March 1861, *The Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America, from the Institution of the Government, February 8, 1861, to its Termination, February 18, 1862, Inclusive*. (Richmond, 1864), pp. 5462 "An Act Amendatory of an Act for the Organization of the Staff Departments of the Army and an Act for the Establishment and Organization of the Staff of the Army of the Confederate States, 14 March, 1861, O.R., IV, 1, p. 163.
13. "An Act to Provide for the Public Defense," 6 March, 1861, *Statutes*, pp. 45-46.
14. O.R., IV, I, p. 126.
15. A.C. Myers to Captain J.M. Gale, 19 April, 1861 in *Letters and elegrams Sent, Confederate Quartermaster General's Office*, National Archives (cited hereafter as NA), RG 109, Chapter V, Cited hereafter as *Letters Sent*, CSQMG.
16. *Ibid.*, Myers to Galt, 19 April 1861.
17. *Ibid.*, Myers to Galt, 24 May 1861.
18. *Ibid.*, Myers to Galt, 31 May 1861.
19. Galt to Myers, 31 May 1861 in *Register of Letters Received, Confederate Quartermaster General's Office*, NA, Chap. 5, Vol. 1, and Myers to Galt, 3 June 1861, *Letters Sent*, CSQMG.
20. Myers to Galt, 4 June 1861, *Letters Sent*, CSQMG.
21. *Ibid.*, Myers to Galt, 5 June 1861.
22. *Ibid.*, Myers to Galt, 12 June 1861; Myers to Winnemore, 12 June 1861.
23. *Ibid.*, Myers to Galt, 19 June 1861; Myers to Winnemore, 21 June, 24 June, 27 June 1861.
24. *Ibid.*, Meyers to Galt, 5 June 1861.
- 25.

26. *Ibid.*, Myers to Lt. John R. Cooke, AAQM, 5 July 1861; Myers to LTC W. L. Cabell, Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac, 9 July 1861.
27. *Ibid.*, Myers to Capt. J.A. Johnston, 19 July 1861.
28. *Ibid.*, Myers to Gen. John B. Floyd, 20 July 1861.
29. *Ibid.*, Myers to T.W. Lane, Esq., Glennville, AL, 6 September 1861.
30. NA, Compiled Service Records, Major Richard P. Waller, Captain O.F. Weisiger, *Compiled Service Records of General and Staff Officers and Non Regimental Enlisted Men*, cited hereafter as CSR.
31. Gaff, pp. 70-71.
32. OR. I, XXIII, 2, pp. 766-769.
33. *Shipping Book, Richmond Clothing Depot, 1863-1865* NA, RG 109,
34. Chapter V, Vol. 218, Cited hereafter as *Shipping Book*
35. Gaff, pp. 68, 144.
36. *Shipping Book*.
37. Contrás, 12 January 1864, QMG with David Rosenberg and Lewis and Elias Haiman, NA, RG 365, Entry 59, *Treasury Dept., Contracts.*; NA, RG 109, Chapter V, Vol. 227, *QMD Memoranda Book, 1864*. Numerous letters detailing clothing manufacture by these societies may be found, for example, in the Alabama Quartermaster's papers at the Alabama Dept of Archives and History, Montgomery. See also Circular, from the Quartermaster General of South Carolina to the Soldiers Aid Societies of South Carolina, *Charleston Mercury*, 19 October 1861.
38. Myers to Gov. Henry T. Clark, 12 June 1862, *Letters Sent, CSQMG*; Myers to BG Ira Foster, QMG, State of Georgia, 12 November 1863, *Georgia Division of Archives and History*.
39. "Address of Governor Zebulon Vance to the Association of the Maryland Line," in Walter Clark, *North Carolina Regiments, Vol. I*, p. 35.
40. G.O. 100, Adjutant & Inspector General's Office (A8clG0), 6 December 1862.
41. Letter, Dan Brown, Historian, Kenesaw National Battlefield Park to author, 1978.
42. G.O. 100, ABr.IGO, 6 December 1862.
43. An exception is in CSR, Adrian, James F., Co. F, 48th Alabama Infantry, requisition dated 30 June 1863. Among 24 trousers is "1 captured."
44. Advertisement, HQ South Carolina Militia, 15 February 1861. *Charleston Mercury*, 20 February 1861. Several single breasted frock coats for enlisted men exist with histories of belonging to Georgia state soldiers during the Atlanta campaign.
45. *Abstracts of Articles Purchased, Received, Issued, Sold, Lost and Expended by Captain Richard P. Waller, Assistant Quartermaster at Richmond, 1861-62*. NA, RG 109, Chapter V, Vol. 244.
46. Crenshaw & Co., Richmond, VA, NA, RG 109, *Confederate Papers Relating to Citizens or Business Firms*, cited hereafter as CBF.
47. Kelly, Tackett & Ford, Manchester, VA, RG 109, *CBF*.
48. Bonsack & Whitmore, Bonsack's Depot, VA, *CBF*. Scottsville Woolen Mills, Scottsville, VA. *CBF*. *Shipping Book*.

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